prospect that public transfers may be effectively neutralized by compensatory reductions in private transfers.
Food aid represents a primary form of transfers in many low-income, rural communities around the world, perhaps especially in East Africa. Ethiopia is now the largest food aid recipient worldwide and Kenya, Sudan and other states in the region rely disproportionately on international food aid for public transfers to rural inhabitants.
However, the international development community has long expressed a range of concerns about food aid, including the fear that food aid breeds "dependency", commercial trade displacement, its misuse by warring parties in conflict settings, and its efficacy in reaching the poorest. Barrett (2002) argues that the root of these prospective problems lies in targeting errors in food aid distribution and operational agencies 1 show a growing interest in assessing and improving the efficacy of food aid targeting.
The efficacy of food aid targeting depends on at least three factors. First, how is the targeting done? A significant literature on different targeting modalities has emerged over the past fifteen years, with a push among operational agencies first to self-targeting and indicator targeting and, most recently, for community based targeting (Barrett and Maxwell 2005; Coady, Grosh, and Hoddinott 2003) . As yet, there remains scant empirical evidence directly comparing performance under alternative targeting modalities.
Second, how do public transfers affect private flows? Is there "crowding out" of private flows by public ones, as some previous studies have found (Cox, Hansen, and Jimenez 2004; Dercon and Krishnan 2003; Cox and Jimenez 1995) , or might there even be "pass through" wherein non-needy recipients of public transfers increase the private transfers they make to needy households in response to direct targeting errors? Current enthusiasm for community-based targeting, depends, in part, on an untested hypothesis that non-trivial "pass-through" occurs, i.e., that private transfers effectively redistribute public transfers so that resources passed through are in effect indirect transfers to the poor mediated through non-needy unintended beneficiaries.
Third, external assistance is arguably most necessary in response to (or in anticipation of) covariate shocks that limit the ability of households within a community to assist family, friends, and neighbors (Dercon 2004) . Given the typically superior information households have about one another relative to the information readily available to outside operational agencies, private inter-household transfers (so-called "social insurance") are generally better instruments for addressing idiosyncratic, household-level shocks than are external injections of resources. But covariate economic shocks -i.e., the common covariance of assets or incomes -as distinct from potentially imprecise correlates of covariate shocks, such as rainfall, are difficult to observe and we know little about the responsiveness of transfers to covariate economic shocks.
This paper explores these three key topics: how efficacy varies by targeting modality, how food aid flows affect private transfers, and how food aid responds to covariate shocks. Our data cover nearly 300 households in ten northern Kenyan and southern Ethiopian communities interviewed quarterly between June 2000 and December 2001. As such, this study is one of the few panel data analyses of food aid anywhere and the only one at reasonably high frequency and with a significant number of repeated observations across households. Moreover, we focus on pastoral households in the arid and semi-arid lands (ASAL), the region's subpopulation that is both most subject to climatic shocks and of greatest current concern among donors regarding prospective food aid dependency.
Panel data permit us to estimate shocks and to control effectively for both time-varying factors such as rainfall or violence in determining food aid flows and for observable and unobservable community-level factors (e.g., NGO presence, accessibility, leadership quality, social cohesion) that likely affect both external food aid transfers and interhousehold redistribution within the community.
We also benefit from a quasi-natural experimental design as these data span three different targeting modalities, enabling direct exploration of differences due to targeting methods. In southern Ethiopia, food aid flowed to households through either selftargeting food-for-work schemes (FFW) 2 or free food distribution (FFD) relying on indicator targeting based on age and gender of the household head or the presence of children in the household, with no work requirement. Meanwhile, food aid distribution in our northern Kenya sites has moved to community-based targeting (CBT), wherein outside agencies eschew direct household level targeting, which is decided entirely by the recipient community. Generally, the northern Kenyan communities distribute food uniformly across households, pro-rated based on an often outdated 3 roster of registered household headcounts, due to pressures within communities to share resources equally among all residents.
Although equal division of transfers across households is not unique to this setting, it is not a necessary nor a ubiquitous feature of CBT. Assessments of other CBT programs have found that communities, schools, or religious organizations target the poorest households relatively well (see Conning and Kevane (2001) for a good review of the evidence). Because the form of CBT employed by communities in our study does not attempt to target the poor, the results of our analysis of CBT are directly applicable only to communities engaging in equal distribution of transfers.
Further, because of widespread poverty and heavy concentration of activity on herding, pastoral communities are often considered by donors organizations to be homogenous in spite of considerable within-community variability in income, risk exposure, etc. 4 Rather than incur the high costs of reaching difficult-to-identify poor households via FFW or FFD, donors may propose CBT to these communities. While
CBT places the responsibility to target effectively on the shoulders of the community rather than the donors, it may be equally difficult for the community to target effectively.
This non-random application of CBT to hard-to-target communities may impact its targeting performance. Thus, CBT's performance relative to FFW and FFD may be caused more by placement effects of communities that are difficult to target to rather than by inadequate targeting. We have no means to control for placement effects, so this key caveat must be borne in mind as we discuss empirical results. Finally, the existing literature offers no evidence as to whether community-based food aid targeting works better than more conventional methods, as some analysts claim it does for other forms of transfer in other settings (Alderman 2002) .
Several recent studies have examined the efficacy of food aid targeting in Ethiopia, questioning both the determination of which communities should be eligible for food aid and which households within a community should be the food aid recipients (Clay, Molla, and Habtewold 1999; Jayne et al. 2001; Jayne, Molla, and Yamano 2002; Gebremedhin and Swinton 2001) . In assessing the efficacy of food aid targeting, most previous studies have employed hurdle models (Jayne et al. 2001; Clay, Molla, and Habtewold 1999; Gebremedhin and Swinton 2001; Dercon and Krishnan 2003) . 5 We suggest, rather, that a household's decision of whether to accept food or not is made with foreknowledge of an approximate quantity that will be received and thus, that whether a household received food aid and the quantity received should be modeled jointly. We therefore opt for censored regression methods for estimating household food aid receipts as a function of household characteristics, including income and wealth, both potentially endogenous regressors for which we instrument, and community-level shocks. We also interact our variables with indicators for each of the three targeting regimes (community based targeting in northern Kenya, and food-for-work and free food distribution in southern Ethiopia) to establish whether targeting differs across distribution mechanisms.
The ultimate efficacy of targeting depends not only on the direct distribution of public aid but also on their impact on private transfers, which can either take the form of income effects, in which receiving food aid "frees up" resources that are then transferred to needy households or substitution effects in which food aid at least partly replaces private transfers. We refer to the former case as the "pass-through" of transfers and the latter case as the "crowding out" of transfers.
Anecdotal evidence from northern Kenya (Reed 2001; Aklilu and Wekesa 2001) suggests that social safety nets, particularly transfers between relatives and neighbors, provide an important coping mechanism for households. 6 Our data confirm the existence of extensive transfer networks. During the survey period, over 65 percent of Kenyan and nearly 30 percent of Ethiopian households surveyed report exchanging money, livestock, or uncooked food, not including items loaned or borrowed.
In a growing body of literature, some researchers have found that public transfers at least partly crowd out private transfers within communities receiving transfers (Albarran and Attanasio 2001; Cox, Hansen, and Jimenez 2004; Dercon and Krishnan 2003) .
However, the extant literature on crowding out of private transfers is hampered by lack of data which tracks both private transfer and public transfer information or it relies on limited transfer data. We have data on monetary and all major non-monetary transfers, such as food and livestock, in our survey communities. After including proper controls for a range of other covariates likely to affect inter-household transfers both given and received, we can test directly whether food aid receipts have any pass through or crowding out effects on private transfers. Further, we can break out food transfers from all transfers, which include cash and livestock, in order to test for possible limits to fungibility in the form of transfer.
Relatively little research explicitly examines how shocks impact private and public transfers. Theory clearly suggests that households use private transfers to address idiosyncratic shocks through social insurance schemes (Coate and Ravallion 1993 ). Yet, social insurance arrangements may not offer adequate protection to members of groups facing covariate shocks, and may break down during significant covariate shocks (Jimenez, Kang, and Sawada 2002) . Public transfers can play an effective role in complementing private transfer arrangements in so far as public transfers can respond to covariate shocks that may limit local households' capacity to smooth consumption through social insurance. We adapt a method previously employed to study food aid's responsiveness to macro-level shocks (Barrett 2001; Barrett and Heisey 2002) to construct a measure of covariate shocks for each household in each survey round, enabling us to examine, for the first time, how public and private transfers respond to covariate shocks. Moreover, by interacting predicted food aid receipts with measures of covariate shocks, we can also establish whether the prospective crowding out or pass through effects of public transfers vary according to the nature of local income and asset shocks.
The plan for the remainder of the paper is as follows. In the next section, we explain our econometric strategy for tackling these issues. We then describe the data. The third section presents estimation results and the last section concludes.
Econometric Strategy
Our objective in this paper is to explore four interrelated issues regarding food aid as it is practiced among pastoralist communities in the arid and semi-arid lands of East Africa.
First, we wish to take advantage of unprecedented availability of detailed panel data to look anew at the efficacy of household-level food aid targeting. Second, we want to take advantage of the quasi-natural experiment in our data to look for prospective differences in efficacy by targeting modality (CBT, FFD or FFW) . Third, high frequency panel data enable us to study food aid's responsiveness to shocks in a way that has never been done at micro-level. Finally, we seek to test whether these data support the hypothesis that public aid flows crowd out private transfers as well as the more novel hypothesis relating public and private transfers, that unintended beneficiaries effectively "pass through"
windfall aid receipts to other households, which could provide an indirect targeting correction for at least some direct targeting errors.
These objectives require addressing a host of econometric challenges related to the panel nature of the data, the potential endogeneity of income and assets with respect to food aid flows and of food aid receipts with respect to private transfers, the need to estimate unobservable covariate asset and income shocks, as well as the censored nature of the food aid receipts and private transfer gross inflows and gross outflows dependent variables we study. This section explains our strategy for resolving these challenges.
Estimating income, assets and shocks
Food aid receipts are likely codetermined with contemporaneously observed household income and assets. For example, food aid may improve nutrient intake, resulting in increased worker productivity and therefore increased income. Furthermore, many pastoralists do not visit towns often and may link a trip to a food distribution center with other in-town activities, such as trading or selling animals or animal products, so as to justify the fixed transaction costs associated with travel. Income and assets may thus be endogenous regressors in the determination of a household's food aid receipts. We use standard instrumental variables estimation methods to resolve this problem. 7 In so doing, we also create the covariate asset and income shock variables we need to test for food aid's responsiveness to community-level shocks.
We estimate separate instrumenting equations for income 8 and livestock holdings, the chief asset held by sample households, and then compute asset and income shocks based on the decomposed residuals from the instrumenting equations. Our model for instrumented income is:
where Y ijt is income for household i from community j at time t. The matrix of regressors X ijt includes household size, gender of the household head, age and age-squared of the head of household, the number of children in a household, the previous and current quarter's rainfall (mm) and indicator variables for possession of a bank account, insecurity in the previous quarter, country of residence (Kenya=1), the previous quarter's income, and a vector of time-and-location specific fixed effects, λ jt , one for each of the 60 quarter and region combinations (10 regions and 6 quarters, with the base case Wachille for the quarter ending September 2000). These fixed effects capture local supply and demand conditions that vary over space and season, such as forage availability, prices, crime and weather patterns, inter-clan or inter-ethnic disputes, etc. The residual, ρ ijt, is the mean zero residual portion of income not explained by these instruments.
In addition to time-and-location specific fixed effects, we also control for householdspecific random effects. Random effects are unobserved effects uncorrelated with the explanatory variables, allowing the econometrician to control for "any remaining serial correlation due to unobserved time-constant factors" (Wooldridge 2002, p. 288) .
9
Following standard panel data econometric techniques, the residual, ρ ijt¸ can be decomposed into two parts:
where ψ ijt is the universal random error for household i in community j during time t and θ ijt is each household's random effect.
Beyond simply controlling for the panel nature of the data, we can also decompose the error term into household-specific (idiosyncratic) and community-specific (covariate) shocks.
10 Covariate shocks, ε jt , reflect the period-specific mean deviation from expected income in community j:
The covariate shock estimate is thus the mean unexplained portion of income in each community each period. One could then define the idiosyncratic income shock as the remaining unexplained portion of household income, i.e., as from the difference between equations (2) and (3):
where ijt Ŷ is the fitted value from equation (1). The idiosyncratic shock estimate, ε ijt , is thus the deviation of each household i's income in community j at time t from its expected value conditional on the covariate shock estimate, ε jt . Our primary interest is the relationship between food aid and covariate shocks to which food aid flows are meant to respond, thus we do not discuss idiosyncratic shocks further.
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We follow precisely the same process to instrument for asset holdings, measured in tropical livestock units (TLUs), 12 and to estimate the covariate asset shock, φ jt for each community and time period. These covariate asset and income shocks, as well as predicted income and herd size values, are key regressors in our subsequent estimation of the efficacy of food aid targeting, its responsiveness to shocks and its effects on private transfers.
Estimating Household-Level Food Aid Receipts
Given our estimates of household-level expected assets and income, and covariate asset and income shocks, we can now study the efficacy of household-level food aid distribution conditional on targeting modality and food aid's responsiveness to shocks.
We use a censored (Tobit) regression model to determine the expected value of food aid conditional on food aid receipt. Households who did not receive aid have left censored observations equal to zero while the value of food aid received is used for recipient households.
13
Our regression model thus takes the standard form, with continuous latent food aid receipts, FA ijt * , a function of observable and instrumented regressors, with a censoring rule on observations of food aid receipts, FA ijt :
The regressors, X ijt , include predicted income and assets, covariate income and asset shocks, household size, gender of the household head, age and age-squared of the head of household, the number of children in a household, last quarter's aid receipts, previous and current quarter's rainfall (in mm), as well as an intercept term. In order to understand how distinct food aid targeting modalities affect food aid receipt, we employ a partial switching regression specification, interacting each X ijt with an indicator variable indicating whether the household resided in a community using community-based targeting (CBT), free food distribution (FFD) or food-for-work self-targeting (FFW) mechanisms during the period. 14 We only use a partial switching regression specification because three household attributes, X ni -possession of a bank account, town-based employment, and insecurity in the previous quarter -are unrelated to targeting efforts and thus we impose the assumption that the effects of these variables do not vary across targeting modalities. We continue to use random effects, now in conjunction with location-specific fixed effects, ζ j , to control for any remaining nonspherical errors.
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Estimating Private Transfers
In order to examine food aid's prospective impacts on private transfers, we regress the latter on predicted food aid receipts -thereby controlling for the obvious endogeneity of food aid -and predicted food aid interacted with covariate income and asset shocks.
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The linear term allows us to test the crowding out and pass through hypotheses directly, while the interaction terms allow for prospective change in those effects due to shocks.
This admits the possibility, for example, that food aid crowds out private transfers only in the presence of negative covariate shocks that leave most households in a community worse off. We estimate separate equations for gross transfers given and gross transfers received. Since both of these dependent variables are left-censored at zero, we again use the partial switching Tobit specification with location-specific fixed effects and household-level random effects.
We use two different, nested measures of transfers. The first is transfers of food, including uncooked grains, sugar, and milk. 17 Estimation results for this narrowly defined form of transfers show whether food aid affects private transfers to or from other households in effectively the same form in which the public transfer was received. The second measure aggregates the value of all non-loan transfers: cash, food, and livestock.
This broader measure reveals whether food aid affects transfers in a more fungible way.
We estimate food transfers received (RFT ijt ), measured as a positive value, as
where We follow this same estimation strategy for the three remaining private gross transfer dependent variables: all transfers received, RAT ijt , food transfers given, GFT ijt , and all transfers given, GAT ijt . The key variables of interest concern the relationship between This specification permits us to disentangle food aid's multiple prospective impacts on private transfers, controlling for crucial intertemporal variation in conditions and in key unobservable covariates at the community-level.
Data and Descriptive Statistics
Our data are unique among evaluations of food aid in that we have a (see table 1 ). This is not the case with respect to assets for CBT recipients, who hold more livestock than do the northern Kenyan households at large.
Econometric Results
Instrumental Variables
The instrumenting equations for income and assets do well, with r 2 of 0. Food Aid Targeting   Table 3 reports the switching Tobit regression parameter estimates of equation (5), explaining the value of food aid received by households. 20 To aid in interpretation of the Tobit coefficients, we compute the marginal effect (ME) of each regressor on the expected value of food aid by multiplying our coefficient estimators by the probability of being uncensored, as shown in the left column. Further, we disaggregate the results into the marginal effect on the probability of receiving aid (second column) and the marginal effect on the value of aid conditional on receipt (third column) using the McDonald - Household size matters to all food aid flows. CBT flows increase modestly with household size as rations were supposed to be based on the number of residents in each household. Note, however, that expected CBT food aid receipts are not increasing when household size increases due to the addition of young children, reflecting the fact that the rosters used for allocating food aid are often quite dated, missing many children. FFW flows likewise increase in household size, likely reflecting the negative effect household size exerts on household-specific shadow wages rates, inducing greater self-selection into FFW programs among larger households (Barrett and Clay 2003) .
With proper controls in place for community-specific fixed effects, household level income and assets, as well as covariate shocks, there appears minimal inertia in food aid distribution, contrary to past findings from the region that had to rely on cross-sectional data (Jayne, Molla, and Yamano 2002) . The previous quarter's food aid was positively and significantly related to current food aid receipts only for CBT households, and then only for about $0.02 more food aid per week per household.
Food aid appears to flow in response to observable community-level shocks. CBT aid is significantly, negatively related to lagged rainfall, consistent with our qualitative field-level observations that food aid shipments into northern Kenya were heavily influenced by recent drought. FFW flows, by contrast, were negatively and statistically significantly related to both lagged and current period rainfall, consistent with the principles of self-targeting under the assumption that lower rainfall reduced the opportunity cost (i.e., the shadow wage) of FFW project participants' time. Free food distribution was strongly negatively related to current period rainfall.
The fact that food aid flows in response mainly to easily observed rainfall shocks rather than to underlying covariate asset or income shocks to which it theoretically ought to respond is underscored by the positive and statistically significant coefficient estimates on covariate asset shocks for both FFD and FFW and on covariate income shocks for CBT distribution. If food aid played an effective insurance role in this setting, it would be negatively and significantly related to asset and income shocks. However, the magnitudes of the estimated effects are quite small under each targeting modality.
Moreover, if income or assets covary negatively with aid receipts due to unobserved common factors, spurious correlation with the instrumenting equation residuals ought to bias downwards the coefficient estimates on the shock variables. Therefore, the fact that we have only one economically and statistically significant negative estimate of food aid flows in response to shocks, i.e. FFD's covariate income shock, seems a strong signal.
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In summary, food aid seems to flow mainly in response to observable rainfall events rather than as a proper safety net to compensate for covariate income or asset shocks. 
Food Aid's Effects on Private Transfers
As previously discussed, we test the crowding out and pass through hypotheses by regressing private transfers received and given, respectively, on the fitted values of food aid receipts obtained from the regressions just discussed. We do this for both food transfers and for the broader set of all cash, food and livestock transfers. Furthermore, we interact predicted food aid receipts with covariate income and asset shocks in order to establish whether crowding out or pass through effects vary with shocks.
In this sample, food aid has no economically or statistically significant crowding out effect on private transfers. When one looks at all transfers received (table 5), the point estimates for the coefficients on predicted food aid receipts are positive and small, not negative and large, as implied by the crowding out hypothesis. Private transfers do appear to respond to FFD food aid receipts interacted with covariate asset shocks and to CBT food aid interacted with covariate income shocks, but the negative signs implies that crowding out only occurs in the presence of positive shocks, i.e., when it is of relatively less concern for neutralizing policy interventions. Moreover, the average effects are quite small. More generally, we reject the joint null hypothesis that all of the food aid terms' coefficients equal zero. A Wald test that the coefficients of food aid receipts, lagged aid, income and asset shocks interacted with food aid all equal zero can be rejected for both CBT food aid recipients (p-value = 0.0102) and FFD food aid receipts (p-value =.0275).
But given the signs of the point estimates involved, this too offers no support for the crowding out hypothesis.
When we re-estimate the model using only food transfers received as the dependent variable, the resulting point estimates suggest, if anything, a modest positive, statistically significant relationship between CBT food aid receipts and receipts of private transfers, suggesting modest "crowding in" rather than crowding out of private transfers in response to food aid flows. As less than 15 percent of sample observations included receipt of private food transfers, however, we place less stock on those estimates.
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We likewise find no strong statistical support for the pass through hypothesis on which some advocacy of community based targeting rests. The estimated coefficients relating food aid receipts to private transfers given are indeed positive, consistent with the hypothesis that increased aid receipts get passed along to others in the form of increased outflows of private transfers from the recipient household. But the magnitudes of the point estimates are quite small and statistically insignificantly different from zero.
Covariate shocks do not have any significant effect on pass through effects associated with food aid. Overall, the Wald test of the joint exclusionary restriction that all the variables involving food aid receipt jointly equal zero cannot be rejected at any reasonable level of statistical significance, with p-values of 0.3410 and 0.1499 for CBT and FFD receipts, respectively. By contrast, increases in expected income, expected assets and covariate asset shocks result in more transfers by households in FFD communities while higher income leads to greater gifts given in CBT communities.
The same qualitative results obtain when we restrict our attention to just food transfers given. In both FFD and CBT communities, estimated food transfers given increases in income, consistent with the views that contributions under social insurance schemes will increase with one's income and that altruistic gifts are a normal good. Food aid has statistically significant pass through effects for both FFD and CBT. However, the point estimates are small in magnitude and, in the case of FFD communities, negative.
Shocks still have no discernible effect in these data on transfer patterns.
The overall pattern is that food aid receipts have no significant effect on recipient households' inflows or outflows of private transfers, i.e., there is no strong evidence of either crowding out or pass through. Cox, Hansen, and Jimenez argue that long term public transfers may render crowding out a "fait acompli" (2004, p. 2194) . In other words, in areas that have long received public transfers, like those we study, perhaps households have already adjusted their transfer patterns to current public transfer levels, leaving only that portion of private transfers that do not respond to public transfers. If crowding out affects private transfers primarily when public transfers first begin and are largely irreversible thereafter, there may be large crowding out effects of de novo public transfer schemes that we cannot capture in this setting. The implication, of course, would be that, in the long-term, the ameliorative effect of public transfers to needy households from well-targeted food aid to areas already accustomed to inflows of aid is not cancelled out by compensatory reductions in private transfers to those households. It is equally true, however, that social networks do not provide an informal corrective mechanism for targeting errors in public distribution via pass-through effects. The net result is to underscore the importance of effective targeting of food aid distribution.
Conclusions
This paper addresses several critical but under-researched questions concerning the distribution of food aid and of public transfers more broadly. Our results corroborate previous findings by other authors that food aid is not especially well targeted by income or assets at household-level in this region. They contradict previous findings that public transfers crowd out private transfers. We find no evidence of such effects.
The availability of multiple periods in a panel permits us to look more carefully at several important hypotheses. We find that inertia in household-level food aid distribution, while significant, plays less of a role than prior, cross-sectional studies suggest. We also find that food aid flows do not respond significantly to communitylevel covariate income or asset shocks. Rather, food aid flows primarily in response to rainfall, a highly imperfect proxy for welfare among the population of interest.
Because food aid was distributed under three different targeting modalities in our survey region, we are also able to compare a bit across these methods. We find that free food distribution based on indicator targeting using household attributes seems more effective in reaching the poor than self-targeting through food-for-work schemes, which is in turn better targeted than food aid distributed following community-based targeting methods. However, because CBT's relatively poorer targeting may be due to program placement effects and local peculiarities of CBT distributions in northern Kenya, rather than to CBT as a targeting modality more generally, we encourage caution in interpreting these results. Rather, our findings underscore that targeting is terribly difficult, even by communities. We find mild evidence of "pass through" of food from CBT food aid recipient households, but the magnitudes involved are far too small to compensate for direct targeting errors in the initial distribution of food aid by operational agencies. 5 Hurdle models are two step processes. First the probability of a household receiving food aid is estimated using a probit model. Then, for households receiving food aid, the quantity of food aid received is estimated using generalized least squares. 6 In most of the research examining food aid targeting or public transfer's impacts on private transfers, including ours, a "community" is identified in geographic terms based on data collection protocols. This community may not be the same as a social insurance network defined by the households interviewed (Santos 2003) . For example, clan or kin based networks may play a stronger role in buffering a household against shocks than do geographic neighbors. The data we use were not collected in a way that permits identification of non-geographic communities. This may well mute the effects of private transfers in this and all preceding analyses that likewise rely on geographic identification of transfer networks. 7 We address the potential endogeneity of some other regressors by using just observations from the baseline survey round, which predates the flow measures of transfers we use as dependent variables. This is our strategy with respect to household composition or the household's possession of a commercial bank account, for example. 8 Income is the sum of the value of production of milk and maize, cash income from nonlivestock activities and enterprises (e.g. wages, salaries, and proceeds from charcoal production, firewood collection, hides, or crafts), and livestock sales proceeds and the value of livestock slaughtered for meat (whether for sale or for home consumption). We exclude private transfers and food aid receipts from income so as to avoid spurious correlation between income and those dependent variables.
9 Note that we use household specific random effects because there is no unbiased parametric fixed effects estimator for Tobit models.
10 One could alternatively try to include measures of observable shocks (e.g., rainfall, quarantines, raids) directly. But since conceptually transfers are meant to flow in response to welfare shocks experienced by households rather than observable, largely community-scale events that may be only weakly correlated with individual level welfare (Smith, Barrett, and Box 2001; Lybbert et al. 2004) , the approach of using the unexplained component of income makes more sense, as Barrett (2001) argues. This seems borne out by our (unreported) results. When we estimate food aid receipts without the computed shock terms, substituting instead a vector of exogenous shock proxies (e.g., raids, quarantines), the results proved nonsensical.
estimates relating idiosyncratic income shocks to food aid or to private transfers, similar to an errors-in-variables problem. Furthermore, computing a likelihood ratio test, we find that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that idiosyncratic shocks have no additional explanatory power over the specifications we employ (p-value = 0.8315).
12 A TLU conversion assigns metabolic equivalence weights to each type of livestock where 1 TLU = 1 Cattle = 0.7 Camels = 10 Goats = 10 Sheep. 13 We value food aid receipts for the primary goods received: maize and wheat. Food aid can be supplemented with very small quantities of oil, beans, and unimix (a blended fortified food). However, we lack price information for these products. Therefore, the value of food aid is slightly underreported. We use community maize prices to value wheat, for which prices were not collected, using an adjustment factor of wheat to maize prices for Ethiopia. In 1999-2000, using Ethiopian commodity price data supplied by Michigan State University for Ethiopia as a whole, the unconditional mean ratio of wheat/maize prices (i.e., the ratio of birr/kg prices) was 1.459.
14 CBT was in force in our northern Kenya locations throughout the survey period. In southern Ethiopia, both FFD and FFW were available in each community at different points in time. No households simultaneously received both types of food aid.
Households who received one form of aid in a period were assigned a zero for the other sort of aid that period, while all other households in southern Ethiopia were classified as eligible and thus were assigned an indicator value of one. There are obvious possibilities for program placement effects because operational agencies' choice of CBT versus FFW or FFD methods is not completely random as well as selection effects, because households choice to participate in FFW instead of FFD, or vice versa, need not be random either. However, we have no suitable instruments in these data with which we could control for the selection effect within these communities, nor do we have data on other communities that could be used to identify the prospective placement effects. 15 We do not use time-and-location fixed effects for the food aid and private transfers equations due to too few observations in each time-location subsample after breaking out food aid into three forms of targeting. 16 For less than half of the censored households, 422 of 1050, the predicted value was negative. Because we do not observe negative food aid, we convert these negative values to zero predicted food aid. 17 We are constrained to estimating food transfers as the values of sugar, milk, and maize received, due to lack of prices for other products, such as tea, legumes, and oil. But, these latter products are a very minor component of recorded inter-household flows. (http://www.oanda.com/convert/fxhistory). Inflation was low during the survey period and no credible deflators are available for these regions of Ethiopia and Kenya.
Therefore, we did not deflate nominal values.
19 Since we use lagged values both in instrumenting for assets and income and of food aid, we must drop the June 2000 survey round from the estimation, reducing the sample to six usable panel rounds. 20 Across the Tobit equations, N'Gambo is the omitted community in northern Kenya, and Dida Hara is the omitted community in southern Ethiopia. The omitted intercept is FFW for the food aid targeting equations. In the transfer equations, FFD is omitted.
31 21 Bear in mind that the Tobit model does not maximize the R-squared value, but rather maximizes the log-likelihood function (Wooldridge, 2002. p. 529) . 22 We also tried specifications that included quadratic shock terms to allow for possible nonlinear effects, as might occur if flows respond only to relatively substantial shocks, but not to modest perturbations. We found no evidence that higher-order polynomial specification in shocks added any explanatory power to the simpler linear specification presented here. 23 We retain attributes not commonly used in targeting (e.g., holding a bank account, in town work, receiving food aid in the previous quarter). 24 The results are qualitatively very similar if we retain the location-specific fixed effects.
A table of results is available from the authors by request. 25 As discussed previously, the data do not allow us to discern whether the failure to reach the poor is due to targeting mechanism or program placement. 26 We omit the tables reporting the regression results for food transfers received and food transfers given. These are available from the authors by request. Prob > χ 2 = 0.0000 Proportion of observations censored = 0.327 Note: For dummy variables, dy/dx is for discrete change from 0 to 1. *, ** and *** reflect statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. ‡ indicates an instrumented regressor. Marginal effects cannot be computed for the constant term. Its coefficient from the Tobit estimation is 14.76***. Prob > χ 2 = 0.0000 Proportion of observations censored =.659 Note: For dummy variables, dy/dx is for discrete change from 0 to 1. *, ** and *** reflect statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. ‡ indicates an instrumented regressor. Marginal effects cannot be computed for the constant term. Its coefficient from the Tobit estimation is -75.7136***. 
